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and Procurement of Human Eggs
for Stem Cell ResearchThe nature of compensation for women who donate eggs (oocytes) for research remains a contentious issue
internationally. This position paper lays out the arguments for, and discusses the arrangements in which,
a modest payment might be ethically justifiable.Introduction
In 2006, the International Society for StemCell Research (ISSCR)
publishedGuidelines for the Conduct of Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research. The task force grappled with the issue of financial
consideration for eggs (oocytes) used in such research, finally
recommending that local stem cell research and ethics review
committees, where allowed by law, might determine the nature
of compensation, ensuring that it does not constitute an undue
inducement (Daley et al., 2007). At the 2009 ISSCR Annual
Meeting in Barcelona, the Ethics and Public Policy Committee
of the ISSCR hosted a debate on the ethics of payments
(in cash or kind) to egg providers. This Position Paper is the
culmination of the Committee’s discussions over the subsequent
36 months. In this document, the Committee formulates a view
on the ethical acceptability, under certain specified and regu-
lated conditions, of payments (in cash or in kind) to women
providing eggs for stem cell research. The Committee’s view is
that stem cell researchers should act to ensure that human
eggs for research are sourced ethically.
There is an escalation in demand and a worldwide market for
human eggs. Eggs are procured and provided in a number of
combinations of circumstances: the purpose might be for
researchand/or for treatment, theprovidersmight be IVFpatients
or women in the community (‘‘non-IVF patients’’), or there might
be varied arrangements of exchange (for cash or for payment in
kind or for no tangible return). Each of these circumstances raises
major conceptual, ethical, and socioeconomic questions, many
of which have been extensively debated elsewhere.
We do not engage directly or in detail with those debates,
though we acknowledge their importance in providing a spring-
board for our discussions. Instead we lay out the progression
of our argument through consideration of various stages of the
debate. The stages we cover are as follows: (1) current arrange-
ments for providing eggs for research in exchange for payment;
(2) arguments identifying the scientific need for human eggs for
research; (3) whether there are ways of avoiding the use of
human eggs in research; (4) the need to recognize the contribu-
tions made by women providing eggs for research; (5) a con-
sideration of the arguments against giving payments to those
providing eggs; (6) systematic responses to those concerns;
(7) our conclusions. Such a style, while affording brevity and
clarity, does not allow for a nuanced discussion; however, the
details of each position can be found in the literature cited and
in the other publications of the authors listed here.
Clearly the terminology in this field is highly contestable and
any particular choice of terms shifts the grounds of the debatein certain directions. Therefore, in Section 1 we clarify our use
of key terms, to ensure consistency with the position that we
advocate here, rather than attempt to provide an uncontested
lexicon.1. Current Arrangements for Paying Women Who
Provide Eggs for Stem Cell Research
There are three broad sets of arrangements under which women
currently provide eggs for stem cell research in exchange for
payment, in cash or kind, beyond reimbursement for actual
expenses incurred:
1. The first is where womenwho are undergoing fertility treat-
ment can provide a proportion of their eggs for research in
exchange for reduced IVF fees; a scheme established in
the UK refers to this as ‘‘egg sharing’’ (Choudhary et al.,
2012; Haimes et al., 2012).
2. The second arrangement is where women who are not
undergoing fertility treatment are encouraged to provide
eggs for research. Women are compensated for the time
and inconvenience associated with donation, their willing-
ness to accept some risk, and out-of-pocket expenses. In
other words, the compensation is not for the eggs, but
rather for undergoing the processes involved in providing
those eggs. This is legally permitted in some parts of the
USA (though state laws are variable and in some cases
unclear). In 2009, New York State’s stem cell board voted
to permit its funded researchers to give compensation,
beyond direct expenses, to women who provide their
eggs directly and solely to research. The board argued
that compensation of amounts up to $5,000 was reason-
able, amounts between $5,000 and $10,000 required
sufficient justification, and amounts over $10,000 were
prohibited. The deliberations behind this decision, and
the procedural mechanisms required by the State to
protect the rights and welfare of egg providers, are laid
out in Roxland (2012). In the UK in 2011 the Human Fertil-
ization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) conducted
a review of their gamete donation policies and raised the
existing one-off payment from £250 to £750, to both cover
expenses and loss of earnings to women providing eggs
for treatment or research and to continue the egg sharing
scheme (http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6700.html). One month
before the HFEA announcement the UK-based Nuffield
Council on Bioethics had suggested introducing a pilot
scheme offering payment to women providing eggs forCell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCR 285
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sation beyond out-of-pocket expenses is not permitted
in many other countries, such as Australia and most
European countries.
3. The third arrangement might be called ‘‘egg selling,’’
wherein a specific price is paid for each egg or batch of
eggs. This paper does not cover these arrangements
because we regard them as ethically distinguishable
from egg sharing and from compensation for the donation
process. Commercial transactions involving a substantial
payment or reward for eggs are ethically highly controver-
sial. In the UK, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011)
rejected arrangements involving the sale and purchase
of eggs while advocating the pilot scheme mentioned in
point 2 above; this suggests that they also distinguish
between compensation for providing eggs and egg selling.
The focus of this paper is to discuss those arrangements in
which amodest payment, where efforts aremade to avoid undue
inducements (in cash or kind), might be ethically justifiable. For
example, the HFEA payment of £750 was set at a level to avoid
‘‘attracting those who are merely financially motivated.’’2. The Scientific Need for Human Eggs in Stem
Cell Research
It is argued that human eggs are needed for stem cell research in
a number of areas to improve somatic cell nuclear transfer
(SCNT) techniques, to thereby advance SCNT applications, to
better understand early human development, and to assist
stem cell research more widely. There is also competition for
eggs for research on preventing mitochondrial diseases,
improving fertility treatment, and assisting recognition of, and
thereby avoiding, fetal abnormalities. The use of eggs in stem
cell research involves either direct research on and with eggs
or the creation of embryos; those embryos might then be used
to derive stem cell lines. As early as 2005 stem cell researchers
identified the need for fresh, healthy eggs rather than eggs that
had failed to fertilize (Stojkovic et al., 2005).
There are, therefore, various circumstances where scientific
objectives rely on the creation of human embryos from eggs
provided for research. However, stem cell researchers continue
to note the shortage of human eggs for research (Noggle et al.,
2011). Assuming that human embryonic stem cell research,
and research into infertility andmitochondrial disease, is thought
desirable, it is clear that there is a shortage of human eggs
for use in research and that many more eggs will be needed.3. Are There Ways to Avoid Using Human Eggs
in Stem Cell Research?
It might be argued that other routes can be followed to achieve
the same knowledge and therapeutic potentials identified above,
obviating the need for research on eggs and thus for women to
provide their eggs for stem cell research. However, a brief review
of the main arguments suggests that this is not the case.
1. The derivation of human embryonic stem cell lines can be
achieved using human embryos in excess of reproductive
need from fertility programs. However, this does not
provide the genetic compatibility offered by using SCNT286 Cell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCRembryos; also there are considerable ethical challenges
in using excess embryos from reproductive programs
(Haimes and Taylor, 2009, 2011a).
2. The need for SCNT and embryo-derived human pluripo-
tent stem cells has been questioned in light of the develop-
ment of induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs), especially
for the purpose of disease modeling or cell replacement.
However, studies are highlighting the epigenetic differ-
ences between SCNT-derived embryonic stem cells and
iPSCs, as well as genetic changes in iPSC lines, leading
to concerns about the generation of abnormalities in
iPSCs (Gore et al., 2011; Hussein et al., 2011; Kim et al.,
2010). While these findings are unlikely to detract from
the critical role of iPSCs in disease modeling, caution will
be needed in their application to cellular replacement
approaches. A strong consensus exists in the scientific
community that research on SCNT-derived stem cells
should continue while the full potential and safety impli-
cations of iPSCs and direct reprogramming are being
explored.
3. In the UK it was argued during parliamentary debates
on the 2008 Human Fertilization and Embryology Act
that creating admixed human embryos (human-animal
embryos) using eggs from cows would avoid the need to
ask women to provide human eggs for research. However,
no research of that kind has been published so this does
not appear to be a viable alternative to using human
eggs, despite the regulation being in place to allow it.
4. Immune ‘‘matched’’ stem cells for research might be
gained by forming an embryo from human gamete(s)
derived only from one person (without using SCNT).
However, this procedure has so far only been successfully
carried out by parthenogenesis using human eggs, thus
not obviating the need for eggs to be provided (Kim
et al., 2007; Revazova et al., 2007). The in vitro creation
of human gametes for use in fertilization, SCNT, or other
ways to derive human embryonic stem cell lines raises
its own ethical issues and for somemight be more conten-
tious than SCNT; even people who accept SCNT might
object to the formation of embryos in this way.
This suggests that stem cell research using human eggs is
scientifically justified, despite or alongside other research being
conducted on other techniques.4. Reasons to Recognize the Contribution of Women
Who Provide Eggs for Research
It has been argued that women’s labor in providing eggs for
research, and the risks that this might entail, have gone unrecog-
nized (Waldby, 2008). The process of providing eggs is arduous,
potentially physically risky, and time consuming. Women have to
undergo a precise, self-administered drug regime to stimulate
their ovaries; this process is risky because hyperstimulation
can occur, the long term effects of ovarian stimulation are
unknown, and the process of egg retrieval can be very painful.
Throughout the process women have to organize their daily lives
to ensure that the medication is administered at the correct
intervals and they have to attend a series of hospital appoint-
ments to monitor their progress.
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of women who might provide eggs for research.
1. Donation of Eggs in the Course of IVF Treatment
It has been argued that women undergoing IVF do not encounter
additional dangers when providing eggs for research because
their treatment necessarily entails all the above labor and risks.
However, findings from a UK study of the donation of fresh
embryos for human embryonic stem cell research revealed
useful insights into IVF patients’ views about the use of their
eggs in research. These patients regarded their eggs as a key
resource for achieving a pregnancy so success in producing
a good number of eggs during treatment was regarded as the
first step toward getting pregnant. Therefore, while the use of
eggs in research is less morally contentious than embryos,
eggs are seen as being extremely precious. Giving away any of
those eggs to research is seen as putting their chances of preg-
nancy at risk; this might explain why a scheme asking women
to provide two eggs to research, without compensation, if 12
or more eggs were produced was not very successful and was
replaced by an egg sharing scheme (see Section 1(1)). Most of
the IVF women interviewed would prefer not to provide eggs to
SCNT research until they had achieved a pregnancy, even
though the research itself was regarded as important (Haimes
and Taylor, 2009). This suggests that even women not encoun-
tering additional physical risks (to those faced in routine IVF
treatment) to give their eggs should still be compensated for
the potential risks to their chances of pregnancy. A study of
the egg providers’ experiences of the UK egg sharing scheme,
in which IVF patients provide 50% of their eggs in one cycle
(if six or more eggs are produced) suggests that these women
are prepared to risk their chances of pregnancy in one cycle
only because the compensation provided means that they
can afford an additional cycle of IVF, thereby giving them an
additional chance of success (Haimes et al., 2012).
2. Donation of Eggs Outside of IVF Treatment
Women not undergoing IVF treatment will lose time from work
or other responsibilities and will experience major disruption of
their daily lives. These alone are enough to justify some sort of
compensation; the physical risks encountered reinforce this
claim (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). The Chair of the
UK’s HFEA argued that the increase in 2011 in compensation
for egg donors (see Section 1) was a ‘‘fair reflection of the effort,
the time, and the pain’’ involved in providing eggs (http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/health-15356148). Anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that many women not undergoing IVF treatment are willing
to provide eggs for research, but most do not proceed when they
are toldmore about the time involved and the invasiveness of egg
collection (Skene, 2010), a view confirmed by Egli et al. (2011).
5. Ethical Concerns about ‘‘Rewarding’’ Women
for Providing Eggs for Research
Wenowbriefly outline the ethical concerns commonly raised about
compensating women for providing eggs for stem cell research.
In thenext section,weproffer counterarguments to theseconcerns.
Concerns Specific toWomen in IVF Treatment Programs
1. It is argued that offering a reward for providing eggs might
compromise women’s autonomy, especially if recruitment
starts early in the fertility treatment process. This isthought to inhibit women’s ability to make a free choice
(give informed consent) because they may discount or
overlook the potential risks and burdens through their
desire to have a child and therefore access more afford-
able treatment (Hyun, 2006; Skene, 2009).
2. It is also argued that poorer womenmight be vulnerable to
exploitation because they might give up much-wanted
eggs in order to access treatment they cannot otherwise
afford.
3. There might be a conflict of interest for IVF practitioners if
they advocate compensation for patients providing eggs
because this could be seen as encouraging provision
and therefore promoting the practitioner’s broader
research interests over the interests of their patients
(particularly if points 1 and 2 above are thought to hold
sway).
4. It has been argued that resources that are available for
fertility treatment should not be allocated to nonfertility
research. Under the principle of ‘‘just participant selection’’
(Ballantyne and de Lacey, 2008), eggs obtained for
research into fertility should be obtained only from women
in fertility programs and their eggs should be used only for
such research. Eggs for other types of research, such as
drug development, should be obtained only from volun-
teers with a family interest in the medical condition for
which the drug is being developed. Therefore it might be
argued that compensation for providing eggs might
encourage this ‘‘diversion’’ of eggs from fertility research
toward nonfertility research.
Concerns Relating to Women Who Are Not Undertaking
IVF Treatment
1. Where women are not undertaking fertility treatment, it is
argued, on the same grounds of autonomy and informed
consent, that it is inappropriate to encourage them
(through the offer of reward) to take significant risks
(such as the possibility of developing ovarian hyperstimu-
lation syndrome and the long-term effects of any form of
stimulation) solely for the purpose of research.
Concerns about the Exploitation of Vulnerable Women
1. There might be exploitation of impoverished women if
there are economic inequalities either within a country or
across national borders (Widdows, 2009). Such exploita-
tion might occur either through the ‘‘cross-border trade’’
in eggs or through the movement of scientists to exploit
regulatory conditions more favorable to their research
(Haimes and Taylor, 2011b).
Wider Concerns about Commodification and Altruism
There is a concern that practices in egg provision and procure-
ment might affect broader values in other areas of research.
1. One concern is that eggs might be commodified by this
practice and that this might set a precedent for the
commodification of other body parts. It is argued that
the best scheme for the provision of eggs and other bodily
material for research is an altruistic system of donation.Cell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCR 287
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providing eggs could create an unfortunate precedent in
countries where payment for blood, tissues, and organs
is the exception (Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, 2011), thereby undermining long-
established and widely accepted systems of nonremuner-
ative donation practices.
3. Rewarding women who provide eggs for research dimin-
ishes the moral value of altruistic donation. It might deter
women who would donate their eggs altruistically but
not provide eggs for reward.
6. Responses to These Ethical Concerns
We acknowledge the importance of these concerns and make
the following responses.
Concerns Specific toWomen in IVF Treatment Programs
1. Offering women in fertility treatment programs a reward for
providing some of their eggs for research is ethically justifi-
able to compensate them for their willingness to accept
added anxiety and some risk of reduced chances of
pregnancy (see Section 4(1)).
2. This is not a payment for the eggs themselves; women will
be entitled to the compensation even if no eggs are
collected or the eggs collected are not suitable for the
research. (However, IVF patients would not be entitled to
compensation if they changed their minds about providing
eggs for research and decide to keep all their eggs for their
own treatment, since this means that their chances of
success in achieving a pregnancy will not, after all, have
been compromised by the research [see point 1 above].
This is the agreement in the HFEA-licensed egg sharing
scheme in the UK).
3. Women’s autonomy will not be compromised if
researchers take proper care to ensure that women are
fully informed. Consent processes are not always ideal
but every effort should be made to ensure the consent
process is optimized for the local community and
that the entire egg donation process, including the
risks, is adequately considered. Competent adult women
can decide for themselves whether to provide their eggs
for research, as long as they are properly informed
(Haimes et al., 2012). Recruitment systems can also be
designed to avoid pressure on women to provide
their eggs for research, such as a scheme that is based
on women taking the initiative to come forward to
provide eggs (as in the UK egg sharing scheme), rather
than being put in the position of having to respond to
direct requests for eggs from clinicians supervising their
IVF treatment.
4. With regard to other equity issues, it is true that reward
may be more attractive for women of limited means than
for wealthy women. However, the objection that this
makes the reward inequitable, and may lead poorer
women to take more risks, may be met by noting that
some of these women will not be able to get fertility treat-
ment without a scheme of this kind. As long as their choice
is free and informed, and as long as the terms are fair,
compensation schemes can actually increase access to288 Cell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCRsuch treatment for women whose economic conditions
would otherwise disallow it (Haimes et al., 2012). It is
unrealistic and unfair to require them to wait for state
funding schemes for fertility treatment to be changed.
Nonetheless, policy debates on how to facilitate wider
access to fertility treatment should continue.
5. Potential conflicts of interest for practitioners in fertility
treatment (who might want to treat women successfully
but also participate in research) could be minimized by
applying the ‘‘principle of separation.’’ This is an arrange-
ment in which those who recruit tissue providers, and/or
inform them of the research risks and benefits, are sepa-
rate from the personnel who have the role of caring for
women in treatment programs.
6. The question of ‘‘just participant selection’’ in the area of
egg provision for research (whether or not for reward)
raises the wider question of who makes, or should make,
the decision about the appropriate use of eggs. Ongoing
studies are investigating egg providers’ preferences for
the possible research uses of their eggs and we regard
these studies as a vital component in this debate. If
most women who provide eggs for research want those
eggs to be used only in research on infertility, those wishes
should inform the development of future policies on the
provision of eggs for research.
Concerns Relating to Women Who Are Not Undertaking
IVF Treatment
1. Women who are not receiving IVF treatment are being
compensated for undergoing the procedures involved,
rather than for the eggs themselves. As with women
undergoing IVF, they will receive strong ethical protection
against exposure to reduced autonomy, undue risks, and
exploitation by robust procedures ensuring voluntary
participation, fully informed consent, and rigorous ethical
oversight. Competent adult women will be able to decide
for themselves if they wish to provide eggs under such
conditions.
2. Other healthy people who participate in medical research,
including sperm donors, commonly receive some pay-
ment and it is inconsistent to exclude egg provision from
this established compensation system.
Concerns about the Exploitation of Potentially
Vulnerable Women
1. It is presumptuous to assume that poorer women are not
able to make their own decisions about whether they
wish to take health risks in exchange for reward. Some
women may have limited life opportunities available to
them because of background injustices affecting their
lives, but that does not preclude them from making
a rational and informed decision about which opportuni-
ties are preferable.
2. However, it is the proper role of ethics and law to protect
groups and individuals in situations in which they might
become vulnerable. The suggestions, in points 3–6 below
and in the Conclusions, for monitoring the effective
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ously by all parties concerned and be subject to regular
review and investigation (Isasi and Knoppers, 2007).
3. Possible exploitation of other vulnerable women can be
addressed by the requirement of oversight of all re-
search involving the use of human eggs by independent
ethics committees. This should include, as a minimum
requirement, periodic monitoring to identify any dispa-
rate level of contribution by women who are vulner-
able for any reasons within areas of traditional concern
about voluntariness, such as poverty, race, or mental
condition.
4. Concerns about research tourism and the welfare of
women in impoverished countries can be met by requiring
researchers and ethics committees to follow robust and
internationally accepted principles of ethics in the receipt
and brokerage of tissue to be used in research. Again,
ongoing monitoring should alert both researchers and
ethics committees to possible abuse.
5. Researchers who import human eggs for use in research
should be required, as part of the procedure for obtaining
ethical approval for their project in their own country, to
ensure that imported eggs are obtained by a process
that would meet the ethical requirements within their
own country.
6. To reduce the risk that some countries might have lower
ethical requirements in dealings with their own citizens,
international ethics bodies could be encouraged to stimu-
late discussion in other countries about the issues identi-
fied here.
Wider Concerns about Commodification and Altruism
1. Unlike the practice of ‘‘egg selling,’’ the compensations
envisioned in this report do not constitute a ‘‘commodifica-
tion’’ of eggs (Caulfield and Ogbogu, 2012); they are not
a payment for the eggs themselves (for example, the UK
egg sharing scheme is not based on a price per egg).
The suggestion is that compensation should be paid for
participating in the whole process, so that women will be
entitled to receive the reward whether or not eggs are
produced or suitable for research.
2. Compensation for providing eggs need not be a precedent
for procurement of blood, tissue, and organs for research.
Peripheral blood may be donated for research but this is
a minor procedure with few risks, so it is appropriate that
it should be uncompensated, if that is the norm in any
particular country. The same is arguably true of other tissue
that may be donated by a living person for research.
However, solid organs like kidneys cannot lawfully be
removed from a living person for research (only for treat-
ment), so there is no question of anyone being paid for
providing a solid organ for research.
3. The moral value of altruistic donation need not be under-
mined by compensating some women who provide eggs
for research. Altruistic donation could be maintained for
women who do not wish to receive anything for donating
eggs or other tissue (Isasi and Knoppers, 2007; Nuffield
Council on Bioethics, 2011).7. Conclusions
It is evident from the above that the research demand for eggs is
part of a larger global market for human tissue. Anything that is
said about eggs therefore has the potential to impact on wider
debates about the provision and procurement of other tissue
and organs for research and also on debates about the thera-
peutic uses of human tissue. However, those debates, while
overlapping, also have their distinctive considerations and it
would be irresponsible to make too glib a crossover from one
area to another. Therefore, while acknowledging that potential
for overlap, we confine our comments here to reiterating our
views on the role of payments in egg provision for stem cell
research.
For the reasons given above, our position is as follows.
1. Paying (in cash or kind) women for providing eggs for
research is ethically justifiable as a means of compen-
sating them for their time, inconvenience, willingness to
accept some risks, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses. This is not a payment for the eggs themselves.
2. We repeat our view, stated at the end of Section 1, and in
agreement with the ISSCR Guidelines (Daley et al., 2007),
that efforts should be made to avoid payments becoming
undue inducements. We would regard such levels of
payment as constituting ‘‘egg selling,’’ a practice we reject
in Section 1(3).
3. The ISSCR is an international organization and given
the wide socioeconomic variations across its member
countries, it would be inappropriate to specify actual
payment amounts. However, we endorse the view that
payments for providing eggs for research should be
limited, even if higher amounts may be paid where eggs
are provided for treatment purposes. For example, the
UK’s HFEA limit of £750 is well below the payments
obtainable elsewhere in the world for providing eggs for
treatment purposes. (We would also welcome research
on whether payments for eggs for treatment purposes
constitute undue inducements).
4. Fertility clinics and research centers that collect eggs
should establish systems for collecting and, where
possible, publishing data around the procurement and
provision of eggs for research, including information on
eggs providers’ motivations and preferences, who applies
to be an egg provider, who is rejected and why, and long-
term tracking of egg providers’ health.
5. Independent ethics committees should ensure that the
informed consent documentation includes, among other
things (Daley et al., 2007), full information about the risks
involved, a statement that women need not participate,
and a statement that women can withdraw from the
research at any time until the eggs are actually used in
research, without detriment to their treatment. Ongoing
monitoring of consent should ensure that the documenta-
tion is effective when applied in actual everyday practices.
6. The roles of treating women undergoing fertility treat-
ment and recruiting egg providers for research should be
separated.
7. Stem cell researchers, as an additional interest group,
have an obligation of prudent stewardship of this scarceCell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCR 289
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that the tissue that they work on has been ethically
sourced. This applies especially where the tissue is im-
ported from another country for use in research, bearing
in mind the ethical issues that have been highlighted in
this paper.
8. National regulatory bodies must ensure that the ethical
dangers of cross-border trade are avoided or minimized.
9. International ethics bodies should encourage discussion
in other countries about the issues in this paper.
These conclusions should be reviewed in the light of the
analysis of the views and values of egg providers themselves
and the reports of different public bodies dealing with the ethics
of medical and health-related research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
All authors are members of the ISSCR Ethics and Public Policy Committee.
REFERENCES
Ballantyne, A., and de Lacey, S. (2008). Int. J. Fem. Approaches Bioeth. 1,
145–164.
Caulfield, T., and Ogbogu, U. (2012). EMBO Rep. 13, 12–16.
Choudhary,M., Nesbitt, M., Burgess, L., Hyslop, L., Herbert, M., andMurdoch,
A. (2012). Cell Stem Cell 10, 239–240.
Daley, G.Q., Ahrlund Richter, L., Auerbach, J.M., Benvenisty, N., Charo, R.A.,
Chen, G., Deng, H.-K., Goldstein, L.S., Hudson, K.L., Hyun, I., et al. (2007).
Science 315, 603–604.
Egli, D., Chen, A.E., Saphier, G., Powers, D., Alper, M., Katz, K., Berger, B.,
Goland, R., Leibel, R.L., Melton, D.A., and Eggan, K. (2011). Cell Stem Cell
9, 293–294.
Gore, A., Li, Z., Fung, H.-L., Young, J.E., Agarwal, S., Antosiewicz-Bourget, J.,
Canto, I., Giorgetti, A., Israel, M.A., Kiskinis, E., et al. (2011). Nature 471, 63–67.
Haimes, E., and Taylor, K. (2009). Hum. Reprod. 24, 2142–2150.290 Cell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCRHaimes, E., and Taylor, K. (2011a). Bioethics 25, 334–341.
Haimes, E., and Taylor, K. (2011b). Cell Stem Cell 8, 613–615.
Haimes, E., Taylor, K., and Turkmendag, I. (2012). Sociol. Health Illn. 34, 1199–
1214.
Hussein, S.M., Batada, N.N., Vuoristo, S., Ching, R.W., Autio, R., Na¨rva¨, E., Ng,
S., Sourour, M., Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, R., Olsson, C., et al. (2011). Nature 471, 58–62.
Hyun, I. (2006). Nature 442, 629–630.
Isasi, R.M., and Knoppers, B.M. (2007). Stem Cell Res. (Amst.) 1, 37–44.
Kim, K., Ng, K., Rugg-Gunn, P.J., Shieh, J.-H., Kirak, O., Jaenisch, R.,
Wakayama, T., Moore, M.A., Pedersen, R.A., and Daley, G.Q. (2007). Cell
Stem Cell 1, 346–352.
Kim, K., Doi, A., Wen, B., Ng, K., Zhao, R., Cahan, P., Kim, J., Aryee, M.J., Ji,
H., Ehrlich, L.I.R., et al. (2010). Nature 467, 285–290.
London, A.J., Kimmelman, J., and Emborg, M.E. (2010). Science 328,
829–830.
Noggle, S., Fung, H.-L., Gore, A., Martinez, H., Satriani, K.C., Prosser, R.,
Oum, K., Paull, D., Druckenmiller, S., Freeby, M., et al. (2011). Nature 478,
70–75.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2011). Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine
and Research (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics).
Revazova, E.S., Turovets, N.A., Kochetkova, O.D., Kindarova, L.B.,
Kuzmichev, L.N., Janus, J.D., and Pryzhkova, M.V. (2007). Cloning Stem Cells
9, 432–449.
Roxland, B.E. (2012). Regen. Med. 7, 397–408.
Skene, L. (2009). Monash Bioethics Review 28, 28.1–28.8.
Skene, L. (2010). Indiana Journal of Global Studies 17, 211–244.
Stojkovic, M., Stojkovic, P., Leary, C., Hall, V.J., Armstrong, L., Herbert, M.,
Nesbitt, M., Lako, M., and Murdoch, A. (2005). Reprod. Biomed. Online 11,
226–231.
Waldby, C. (2008). New Genet. Soc. 27, 19–31.
Widdows, H. (2009). Int. J. Fem. Approaches Bioeth. 2, 5–24.Erica Haimes1,* Loane Skene2
Angela J. Ballantyne3 Timothy Caulfield4
Lawrence S. Goldstein5 Insoo Hyun6
Jonathan Kimmelman7 Jason S. Robert8
Beth E. Roxland9 Christopher T. Scott10
Jan Helge Solbakk11 Jeremy Sugarman12
Patrick L. Taylor13 and Giuseppe Testa14
1PEALS (Policy Ethics and Life Sciences) Research Centre,
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK
2The Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Melbourne,
Victoria 3010, Australia
3Wellington School of Medicine & Health Science, Wellington 6242,
New Zealand
4Health Law Institute, Faculty of Law and School of Public Health,
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H5, Canada
5Sanford Consortium for Regenerative Medicine, University of
California San Diego School of Medicine, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA
6Department of Bioethics, Case Western Reserve University School
of Medicine, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA
7Biomedical Ethics Unit, Social Studies of Medicine, McGill
University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 0G4, Canada
8School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281,
USA
9Visiting Scholar, Hofstra University Bioethics Center, Hempstead,
NY 11549, USA
Cell Stem Cell
ISSCR: Committee Forum10Stanford Program on Stem Cells in Society, Center for Biomedical
Ethics, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
11Centre for Medical Ethics, Faculty of Medicine, Institute of Health
and Society, University of Oslo, NO-0316 Oslo, Norway
12Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Johns Hopkins
University, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
13The Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and
Bioethics, Harvard Law School, Boston, MA 02138, USA
14European Institute of Oncology, IFOM-IEO-Campus Via Adamello
16, Milan 20139, Italy
*Correspondence: erica.haimes@newcastle.ac.uk
http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.stem.2013.02.002Cell Stem Cell 12, 285–291, March 7, 2013 ª2013 ISSCR 291
